时   间：9月19日(周二)下午4:45-6:00

地   点：金禾中心874教室（大教室）

报 告 人：李迎雪

Introduction：

Dr. Li Yingxue is an assistant professor at Jinhe Center for Economic Research. She got her Ph.D. degree from the Department of Economics, at University of California, Davis in 2017. Her research interests include game theory, behavioral and experimental economics.  

Title：Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment

Abstract：We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (eg., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (eg., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g. a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or iterated admissibility predict unraveling of information. Iterative admissibility also provides predictions for every finite level of reasoning about rationality. Overall, we observe behavior consistent with relatively high levels of reasoning. While iterative admissibility implies that the level of reasoning required for unraveling is increasing in the number of quality levels, we find only insignificant more unraveling in a game with two quality levels compared to a game with four quality levels. There is weak evidence for learning higher-level reasoning in later rounds of the experiments. Participants have problems to transfer learning to unravel in a game with two quality levels to a game with four quality levels. Finally, participants who score higher on cognitive abilities in Raven’s progressive matrices test also display significantly higher levels of reasoning in our persuasion games.